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VOLUME XXX JUNE, 1924 NumE m 4
ARBITRATION AS A JUDICIAL PROCESS OF LAW.
A NEW ERA IN LEGAL PROCEDURE CREATED BY THE
NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY STATUTES.
THE PRINCIPLES AND THE PRACTICE DEFINED
By JOSEPH WHELm*
MAGNA CHARTA, the most venerable charter of Anglo-Amer-
ican. liberties, contains this signal declaration of basic right: "To
no man will we deny, or delay or sell right and justice." This
sovereign assurance of the most fundamental rights of man, one of
the most important muniments of liberty and of civilization, is
consecrated in the Bill of Rights of every American constitution
today. Yet Shakespeare jibed jeeringly at "the law's delays"
three hundred years ago; while today the slow, tedious and costly
course of justice as administered in our courts is probably three-
hundred-fold more serious and grievous than ever it was in the
times of the "myriad-minded" bard of Avon.
Justice delayed is in every sense justice denied and as the heavy
cost to the litigant of judicial remedy prevents the adjudication of
his rights and protects legal wrongs, it is in a very practical sense
justice sold. And these same delays and costs are all too often a
virtual prohibition against seeking judicial justice, so that sacred
and vital rights must go undefended and flagrant wrongs wire-
dressed, in the very tribunals established and maintained to do
* Member of the New York Bar, and member of the Law Committee of the
A o;rnMTX SOCIETY OF AM AIM.
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even handed justice to all men. Thus are the three cardinal guar-
anties of the Great Charter and of our modern constitutions violat-
ed, fundamental human rights made mockery, and the courts of
justice brought into undeserved disrepute.
The fault lies not indeed with the law nor with The courts, but is
rather in most part, the inevitable result of the vast accumulati-ons
of litigation in the great commercial centers, which swamp the
courts and paralyze their otherwise effective machinery. For an
example: in New York City, in the one judicial district composed
of the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx, the calendars of the
Supreme Court (which is the court of first instance trial), are
clogged with some 23,000 pending cases; new issues for trial are
added at the rate of over 13,000 a year; while the greatest efforts
of the thirty trial judges enable them to dispose of only some 8500
cases each year. Thus is visualized the inevitable cause of the
"law's delays" and it is demonstrated that such delays from year
to year must become cumulatively more grievous and more hopeless
for the prompt and effective doing of justice.
Speaking of this acute situation, Mr. Justice Wagner, the able
presiding Justice of the District, said last year in an address before
the Academy of Political Science in New York City: "It takes
about three years for a case to reach trial ...... .This accumu-
lation-which is progressively increasing-produces a situation
where the prodigious arrears cripple the efforts of the judicial
function, decisions and at times resulting in the virtual denial of
justice. For there is nothing truer than the oft-repated aphorism
that justice delayed is justice denied."'
Thus confessed by one of its ablest and most active ministers a
delay of quite three years is fated for every case before it can be
brought to trial and justice rendered by judicial procedure in its
ordinary course in New York City. In these three years of "law's
delays" rights suffer irreparable wrong; wrongs go unrighted;
parties and witnesses die, scatter and disappear; evidence is lost
or destroyed; memories fail and testimony loses its distinct value;
frauds and perjuries evolve and are matured; insolvencies and
bankruptcies intervene, so that when the tardy day of judicial
trial drags the often seriously weakened case to the bar of justice
justice ofttimes cannot be had or is very ineffective. As put by
Mr. Justice Wagner: "The loss of witnesses, the interpolation of
false defenses, subsequent financial irresponsibility, and many
1 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science In the City of New York, Vol.
X, No. 3, July 1923, pp. 184-185.
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other causes hamper and at times prevent the successful prosecu-
tion of rights." 2
Besides frustrated justice resulting from "the law's delays"
further vexatious delays come from appeals with frequent retrials,
and may be further appeals, up and down through the judicial
hierarchy. Added to the time lost, the heavy cost of courts and
counsel, of appeals and the printing of records and briefs, all
constitute a frightful aggregate of economic waste often ruinous
in the individual case and all to the cumulative disrepute of the
law.
While the serious situation just noted is thus acute in New York
City, the evil is not local or peculiar, but exists in varying degree
in every large center of population and business all through the
country. Even smaller and less commercial communities suffer to
some degree from the law's delay and the burden of legal expense,
and all alike suffer the even more deplorable-and easily remedied
-by-products of litigation which we shall have occasion to note
with some emphasis as we proceed.
So much for the grievous ill that gnaws at the vitals of the most
important function of human society, which is the administration of
justice between man and man-the jus suum cuique tribuendi of
the Institutes and the Digest. The remedy, the sovereign remedy,
lies at hand, potent for the fullest restoration of the atrophied
functions of justice-speedily, cheaply, and satisfactorily admin-
istered. In the truest sense it is the sovereign panacea for the
"law's delays" -- arbitration. And arbitration, in the form and
manner of the New York and New Jersey arbitration laws, is the
highest and most effective mode yet devised for the accomplish-
ment of this ideal and thoroughly practical end-the prompt and
economical rendering to every man his just due in law.
This contribution is not designed as a monograph on the common
law of arbitration, therefore, it will not discuss, or but incidentally
mention, the general principles of the law on this subject. They
may be found in any digest or textbook. Indeed a great mass of
such rules is quite obsolete under the comprehensive new statutes
which we shall here consider. As appositely said by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion:
"Such construction makes inapplicable as authorities the earlier
cases decided prior to the enactment of the Arbitration Law." 3
The purpose here in mind is to challenge public attention to the
2 Idem note 1, p. 185.
3 Berizzi v. Krausz Casing Co., January 1924.
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admirable process of arbitration as the most expeditious method for
settlement of legal controversies, and especially to signalize the
manifold advantages of the new status given to arbitration as a
judicial process by the recent Arbitration Laws to be discussed.
In a sentence pregnant with all the force of an aphorism the
New York Appellate Division, First Department, pays this tribute
to the ideal realized by the New York statute: "Arbitration is
intended to be a short cut to substantial justice between the
parties. "'
From the most ancient times arbitration has been a recognized
and approved, a time honored mode of settlement of legal contro-
versies dehors the courts, and has been very widely availed of by
disputants in preference to the slower and more cumbrous pro-
cedure of the regular tribunals. It is beside the purpose to make
display either of erudition of antiquarian lore or to cite historical
instances which are readily available to the curious. On this in-
teresting phase, as well as for the whole subject of arbitration
prior to the new statutes, admirably handled, it is a pleasant duty
to commend to the student and business man"alike Mr. Julius
Henry Cohen's excellent and scholarly "Commercial Arbitration
and the Law.'"' Suffice it, for modern antiquity, to quote the
Supreme Court of the United States in a notable recent decision
under the New York Arbitration Law, which we will have occasion
to particularly notice again: "In England controversies were settled
by arbitration as early as 1320. After the establishment of the
Court of Admnirality about 1340, arbitration became a common
mode of settling disputes in shipping cases.''
The same high court has testified to the value and favor it holds
for the arbitration process: "Arbitrators are judges chosen by
the parties to decide the matters submitted to them, finally and
without appeal ..... As a mode of settling disputes, it [arbitra-
tion] should receive every encouragement from the courts of
equity. If the award is within the submission, and contains the
honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of
the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either
in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the
judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the
parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the
end of- litigation.' "
' Itoh & Co. ,. Boyer Oil Co., 198 App. Div. 881, 884 (1921).
D. Appleton & Co., New York (1918).
* Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274, 276 (1924).
Burchell v. Marsh, 17 Row. 349.
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Mr. Julius Henry Cohen 8 quotes the ex-president of the London
Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of its Arbitration Com-
mittee as thus stating several vital truths bearing upon arbitration
and the relations betweeen arbitration and ordinary judicial pro,
cess:
"Arbitration is indeed the natural right of disputants to
choose their own tribunal, and is the practical art of vindicating
and reconciling disputants, and doing so at a minimum of ex-
penditure of time and trouble.
"Except for arbitration there would be many cases in which
justice would be denied .....
"There is no rivalry in arbitration with the law or the ad-
ministration of the law."
The former obsolescent-and under the new statutes obsolete-
reluctant if not inhosplitable attitude of some courts English,
State, and Federal to the method of arbitration, is expressed in
the trite dictum, "agreements for arbitration cannot oust the
courts of jurisdiction." Acting upon this myopic pseudo-maxim
the courts denied, in large measure, the aid of their processes to
those seeking to enforce executory agreements to arbitrate dis-
putes, and have declined to compel specific performance of such
agreements. At any time before the announcement of the award,
any party to however solemn agreement to arbitrate, and even
after long and arduous hearings, might put on his hat and walk
out of the audience and make a mockery of his covenant. But
even then, as said by the Supreme Court:
"But an agreement for arbitration is valid, even if it provides
for the determination of liability. If executory, a breach will
support an action for damages. If executed that is, if the award
has been made-effect will be given to the award in any appro-
priate proceeding at law, or in equity. And, although there is
no federal legislation on the subject, an executory agreement,
however comprehensive, will, if made a rule of court, be en-
forced in courts of the United States by an appropriate pro-
cess."7
9
The revolt of enlightened and progressive judges against these
illiberal and archaic holdings has been frequently voiced. To
every intelligent person interested in this subject special reccom-
mendation is made to read the illuminating opinion of Judge
Hough, for the United States District Court in the Southern Dis-
* Commercial Arbitration and the Law, p. viii, supra note 5.
* Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., supra note 6.
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trict of New York 0 on motion to stay an admirality suit pending
arbitration as per contract obligation. Among many wise saws
and pregnant comments, Judge Hough says:
"It has never been denied that the hostility of English-speak-
ing courts to arbitration contracts probably originated (as Lord
Campbell said in Scott v. Avery, 4 H. L. Cas. 811)---'in the con-
tests of the courts of ancient times for extension of jurisdiction-
all of them being opposed to anything that would altogether de-
prive any one of them of jurisdiction.' A more unworthy gene-
sis cannot be imagined. Since (at the latest) the time of Lord
Kenyon, it has been customary to stand rather upon antiquity of
the rule than upon its excellence or reason."
In fine, very reluctantly, in deference only to superior authority,
Judge Hough concluded:
"The Supreme Court has laid down the rule that such a com-
plete ouster of jurisdiction as is shown by the clause quoted from
the charter parties is void in a federal forum. It was within the
power of the Supreme Court to make this rule. Inferior courts
may fail to find convincing reasons for it; but the rule must be
obeyed, and these motions be severally denied."
The Supreme Court, be it said, as will be more fully noticed be-
low, has upheld the abrogation of this ancient rule by the New
York Arbitration Law; and of course would so defer to the declar-
ed public policy of any other state.
Citing Judge Hough's trenchant opinion and other like cases,
Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court of Appeals of New
York in the first case"' coming before that Court involving the
new Arbitration Law of 1920, rather triumphantly gave the coup
de grace to the ancient anomaly:
"We think there is no departure from constitutional re-
strictions in this legislative declaration of'the public policy of
the State. The ancient rule, with its exceptions and refinements
was criticised by many judges as anomolous and unjust (citing
cases). It was followed with frequent protest, in deference to
early precedents. Its hold even upon the common law was
hesitating and feeble. We are now asked to declare it so im-
bedded in the very foundations of our jurisprudence and the
structure of our courts that nothing less than an amendment of
our Constitution is competent to change it. We will not go so
far. The judges might have changed the rule themselves if
1O United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed.
1006 (1915).
1 Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib, 230 N. Y. 261, 267 (1921).
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they had abandoned some early precedents as at times they seem-
ed inclined to do. They might have whittled it down to noth-
ing, as was done in England, by distinctions between promises
that are collateral and those that are conditions (citing cases).
No one would have suspected that in so doing they were under-
mining a jurisdiction which the Constitution had charged them
with a duty to preserve. No different is the effect of like changes
when wrought by legislation .....
"There is no merit in the contention that the statute violates
Art. I Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States on
the ground that it violates the obligation of a contract. THE
OBLIGATION OF THE CONTRACT IS STRENGTHENED, NOT IMPAIRED."
The foregoing sufficiently sets forth the previous "anomalous
and unjust" rule of common law-so vainly called "the perfection
of human reason'--whereby the solemn contract to arbitrate en-
tered into by two competent contracting parties, was voided and
annulled three hundred years ago in England by petulant big-wig
judges who desired that their "jurisdiction should not be ousted"
by the free-willed resort of parties to the most expeditious modes
of obtaining justice and the settlement of their controversies.
THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION LAW.
Like no doubt all the states, New York has had from the earliest
times a statute sanctioning "submissions to arbitration" and pro-
viding for the enforcement of awards fairly and regularly render-
ed. This statute is now Article 84, Sections 1448-1469 of the new
Civil Practice Act. In itself it is very comprehensive and effective,
providing full machinery for submission to arbitration by any
competent parties of all manner of justiciable controversies, except
sundry claims to real estate, and matrimonial and criminal actions
and it prescribes the form and manner and contents of the sub-
mission, the appointment, oath, powers, hearings, fees and expenses
of arbitrators, the requirements of the award, proceedings to con-
form or vacate the award, the entry of judgement on the award,
the effect of judgment and enforcement, and certain forms of ap-
peal. Section 143 provides: "The judgment so entered [on the
award] has the same force and effect in all respects as, and is
subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an
action; and it may be enforced as if it had been entered in an
action in the court in which it is entered." So satisfactory is the
general scheme of this statute that it is expressly continued in full
force and effect "so far as applicable and consistent" with the
provisions of the new Arbitration Law of 1920. The only signal
7
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deficiency of the previous statute was that it left the "agreement
to arbitrate" in the "anomalous and unjust" situation of the freak-
ish common law rule voidable by refusal to carry it out, and not
subject to enforcement by order for specific performance.
The simple but cardinal "change wrought by legislation,"
through the Arbitration Law of 1920, was that it abolished the
"anomalous and unjust" common law rule, and "put teeth" into
the agreement to arbitrate by compelling the recalcitrant party
to stand to and abide by his covenant under sanction of compulsion
-just simply as any other lawful contract obligation will be en-
forced by the courts.
An "Editor's Note" to the Chapter is worthy of being quoted
as it gives proper credit for the notable accomplishment of bringing
about the enactment of this epoch-making legislation which raised
arbitration to the status and dignity of judicial process of law.
The Note, which discloses the high parentage and sponsorship of
the new reform law, reads:
"This measure was proposed by the New York Chamber-of
Commerce, and endorsed by the New York State Bar Association.
It supersedes the decisions that an agreement to submit a con-
tract to arbitration, although embodied in the contract, is revoc-
able by a party to the contract. Arbitration of commercial con-
controversies has proven so successful in other jurisdictions, that
commercial bodies generally favored the policy of adopting a
law in this State."
The law first declares its new and revolutionary policy, then
provides the sanction for the enforcement of the contract for ar-
bitration made by the parties. Section 2 is the vital enactment,
and reads:
"Validity of Arbitration Agreements.
"See. 2. A provision in a written contract to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising between the parties to
the contract, or a submission hereafter entered into of an exist-
ing controversy to arbitration pursuant to (the existing statut-
es), shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."
Controversies arising under two sets of circumstances are thus
covered by the statute--these being indeed the only two ways in
which arbitration agreements could possibley become operative:
1. Arbitration agreements contained in contracts existing at
8
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the time of the passage of the law, and "thereafter" a controversy
arises over such contract; and,
2. Controversies existing at the time of the passage of the law,
and the agreement to arbitrate is "hereafter entered into."
Both these phases of origin of the controversy and submission
have come up for adjudication since the law, and it has been fully
sustained with respect to both. And the law as a whole has met
not only the most cordial general approval and been widely called
into operation, but the courts have sustained it in every feature,
a% we will briefly review before considering the practical benefits
of the arbitral system now engrafted into the judicial proceedure.
The second feature of the Arbitration Law, the one which ef-
fects the operation of "putting teqth" into the process by enforc-
ing the agreement to arbitrate upon the recalcitrant party, is as
follows:
"See. 3. Remedy in case of Default. A party aggrieved by
the failure, neglect or refusal of another to perform under a
contract or submission providing for arbitration, described in
section 2 hereof, may petition the supreme court, or a judge
,thereof, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in such contract or submission .....
[Notice and manner of service].
"The court or a judge thereof, shall hear the parties, and
upon being satisfied that the making of a contract or submission
or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court, or
the judge thereof, hearing such application, shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the contract or submission." [Here follow pro-
visions for trying any issue raised as to the making of the con-
tract or submission or of failure to comply therewith.]
Section 4 makes "provision in case of failure to name arbitrator
or umpire," and provides that the method of choosing arbitrators
specified in the contract for arbitration or in the submission shall be
followed; but if no such method is therein provided, or if so pro-
vided any party shall fail or refuse to avail himself thereof, or
there should occur any lapse or vacancy, then, in any such cases,
"upon application by either party to the controversy, the
supreme court, or a judge thereof, shall designate or appoint
an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require,
who shall act under the said contract or submission with the
same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named
therein; and unless otherwise provided, the arbitration shall be
by a single arbitrator."
9
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Section 5 provides that if any suit or proceeding be brought up-
on any issue otherwise referable to arbitration under a contract
or submission as described in section 2, the court or judge, upon
it so appearing, "shall stay the trial of the action until such arbi-
tration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment."
These four brief and simple sections of the Arbitration Law are
"the changes wrought by this legislation" which change the whole
procedure of arbitration from a haphazard voluntary attempt de-
pendent wholly on the good faith of a party to a pending contro-
versy, into a recognized and practically coordinate establishment
for the administration of justice, potent for far reaching good and
pregnant with the utmost possibilities for the relief of the con-
gested courts, the preservation of good will and friendly relations
between parties disputant; and the realization of the ideal of
speedy, cheap and effective right and justice without "denial,
delay or sale" to all parties concerned.
The law compels no man to agree to arbitrate; this is voluntary
-the "will to arbitrate" must preexist to be operative; but once
the agreement is duly made, it holds the evader to his contract ob-
ligations and compels the due performance. As correctly said by
the Federal Supreme Court in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit
Company,'" "The Arbitration Law deals merely with the remedy
in the State courts in respect of obligations voluntarily and law-
fully incurred."
In a lumnious sentence, Judge Cardozo, speaking for the Court
of Appeals of New York, defines the scope and effect of the Arbi-
tration Law: "Section 2 of the statute declares a new public pol-
icy and abrogates an ancient rule." 13 The highest court of New
York, in this first case under the new statute, proceeds to vindicate
this new policy of the modern law:
"Arbitration is a form of procedure whereby differences may
be settled. It is not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of
which differences grow. This statute did not attach a new ob-
ligation to the (contract) already made. It vindicated by a new
method the obligation then existing.
"The statute is assailed as inconsistent with Article I, Sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution of the State, which secures the right of
trial by jury. The right is one that may be waived [cases]. It
was [is] waived by the consent to arbitrate."
22 Supra note 6, at p. 277.
13 Supra note 11, at p. 269.
10
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The Berkovitz Case just cited covered two different suits, pre-
senting distinct phases of the application of the law to agreements
to arbitrate and attempts to enforce such agreements. The valid-
ity of the Arbitration Law" and its application to existing con-
tracts and pending action, were the questions involved. In one case
the arbitration clause was in a contract made before the passage
of the law (April 19, 1920), and the controversy over alleged
breach of contract arose just prior to the passage of the law. In
the other case both contract with arbitration clause and breach
antedated the law, and an action in the courts had long been pend-
ing which it was sought to stay in order to have recourse to the
contractural arbitration under the new law. The court held: "We
think the Arbitration Law is applicable to pre-existing contracts,
but not to pending actions."15 Thus it is settled that no suit may
be brought after the enactment of the law on any contract con-
taining a clause for arbitration; but neither can an action pending
when the law went into effect be taken out of the courts by virtue
of the subsequent validation of the arbitration clause, disregarded
by filing the suit.
The court further held in accordance with abundant authority:
"The common-law limitation upon the enforcement of promis-
es to arbitrate is part of the law of remedies (citing cases). The
rule to be applied is the rule of the forum. Both in this court
and elsewhere, the law has been so declared." 6
This rule is reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States
in the Red Cross Line Case above cited."
The statute was assailed, moreover, as abridging the general
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. VI, Section 1, of the
State Constitution. But this contention is swept aside by the Court
of Appeals in the Berkovitz case:
"Jurisdiction exists that rights may be enforced. Rights are
not maintained that jurisdiction may exist. The People, in es-
tablishing a Supreme Court to administer the law, did not pet-
rify the law which the court is to administer [citing cases] ...
"The Supreme Court does not lose a power inherent in its
very being when it loses power to give aid IN THE REPUDIATION
of a contract, concluded without fraud or error, whereby dif-
ferences are to be settled without resort to litigation.
14 Laws 1920, Ch. 275.
2 Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib., 230 N. Y. 261, 269.
26 Supra note 15, at p. 270.
17 supra note 6, at p. 277.
219
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"FOR THE RIGHT TO NULLIFY IS SUBSTITUTED THE DUTY TO
ENFORCE."' 1 8
As above stated, the general arbitration statute of the State,
continued in force and effect by the 1920 Arbitration Law, provid-
es that the judgment entered on an award "has the same force
and effect, in all respects as. . . .a judgment in an action; and
it may be enforced as if it had been entered in an action in the
court in which it is entered.' '19 The Civil Practice Act further
provides, in Sections 2374 and 2375, the sole grounds upon which
an arbitration award may be vacated or modified; the grounds for
vacating the same being detailed, in substance as summarized in
Section 2 of the Arbitration Law, as "such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Hence, it is
consistently and uniformly held by the courts that "any finding of
fact or conclusion of law of an arbitrator will not be reviewed.' 20
These are instructive cases which may be read to advantage but
need not be more particularly cited here. All agree also in award-
ing hearty judicial approval to the new and highly endowed pro-
cess of arbitration which the Appelate Division terms in thE' Goff
Case 1 as a device "to insure a speedy and conclusive determina-
tion of disputes between parties."
As indicated, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
case of Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,-2 has by an all but
unanimous decision, approved the "new public policy" declared
in the New York Arbitration Law; and even reversed on writ of
certiorari, the holding of the New York Court of Appeals that the
Law could not be made applicable to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment contained in a maritime charter party. This case is of very
far reaching consequences, as in effect it extends the potentialities
of arbitral jurisdiction to nearly every possible human contro-
versy and broadens its field of action to the ends of the earth,
"from the rising of the sun to the going down thereof."
In this case, proceeding under the Arbitration Law, the Red
Cross Line applied to the Supreme Court of New York, in April
1921, for an order directing the Atlantic Fruit Company to join
with it in the arbitration of a dispute growing out of the charter
of the steamship Runa, under a charter party made in November
28 Supra note 15, at p. 274.
2' C. P. A. § 1463.
Itoh & Co. v. Boyer Oil Co., 198 App. Div. 881, and cases cited; D. Goff & Sons
Inc. v. Rheinauer, 199 App. Div. 617; E. 0. Andersen Trading Co. v. Brlmberg,
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1919, before the enactment of the Arbitration Law. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court:
"The substantive claim was that the master had not prose-
cuted the voyage with the utmost dispatch, and hence that cer-
tain amounts paid by the charterer should be returned."
The charter party contained one of the customary arbitration
clauses, providing for the appointment of one arbitrator by each
party, and the third by the two so chosen; the decision of the ar-
bitrators, or any two of them, to be final and made a rule of
court. The Red Cross Line duly appointed its arlbtrator, but the
Atlantic Fruit Company refused to join. Upon application by
the Red Cross Line, the local Supreme Court ordered the Atlantic
Company to proceed to arbitration as provided in the contract, and
to appoint its arbitrator by a day fixed. This order was reversed
by the State Court of Appeals under the opinion that "the con-
troversy between the parties is one of admiralty; that under the
Federal Constitution and the Judicial Code, such controversies
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admirality courts; and
that the State has no power to compel the charter owner to pro-
ceed to arbitrate." But on certiorari to the Federal Supreme
Court, these objections were forcefully overruled; and after an
instructive review of judicial history and authorities, the Court
ruled:
"This State statute is wholly unlike those which have recently
been held invalid by this court.
"'The Arbitration Law deals merely with the remedy in the
State courts in respect of obligations voluntarily and lawfully
incurred. It does not attempt either to modify the substantive
maritime law or to deal with the remedy in courts of admirality
[citing and distinguishing cases] ......
"As the constitutionality of the remedy provided by New
York for use in its own courts is not dependent upon the prac-
tice or procedure which may prevail in admhirality, we have no
occasion to consider whether the unwillingness of the federal
courts to give full effect to executory agreements for arbitration
can be justified. Reversed."
The New York Arbitration Law is thus sustained and vindicated
to its fullest extent, and its scope expanded to the utmost practica-
ble limits. The general arbitration statute, above cited, excepts
from the scope of arbitration only cases "where the controversy
arises respecting a claim to an estate in real property in fee or for
13
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life;" but expressly admits it in respect to all lesser estates and
interests, and with respect to controversies over partition of real
property, the boundaries of lands, and the admeasurement of
dower.23 And, though not expressed, naturally divorce and sep-
aration, and criminal proceedings are by public policy excepted.
But with these limited exceptions, the scope of arbitral procedure
and justice is all-comprehensive; its legitimate field is every other
possible subject of controversy in contract and tort. There is no
limitation, except those named, upon the competency of the parties
to contracts to stipulate for arbitration of any and all subjects of
controversy. And but one limitation has been set upon the power
or the disposition of the courts to compel performance of the ar-
bitration contract, to-wit, where the stipulation calls for arbitra-
tion outside the State. In such case, it has been held: "That while
an agreement to arbitrate in a foreign jurisdiction, and before a
foreign arbitrator, is not invalid or illegal, it cannot be enforced
as between citizens of this State who are the parties thereto, by
compelling them to go without the state in a foreign jurisdiction
and before a foreign tribunal, there to arbitrate their disputes." 2-'
But in such case, the recalcitrant party does not dodge his obliga-
tion with entire impunity; he cannot maintain a suit in our courts
in disregard of his agreement to arbitrate: "the remedy available
under such circumstances in the courts of this state is to stay the
trial of an action here by the party who refused to carry out his
agreement to arbitrate, and who seeks the aid of our courts to
enforce his claim therein."
This decision, denying recourse to the courts by the party who
wilfully repudiates his contract obligation to arbitrate, will do
much to discourage the dishonest practice in interstate cases, just
as the statute makes it possible within the State. The case just
cited was an interstate shipment from California to New York;
and the contract contained a clause providing for arbitration of
any dispute before the Arbitration Committee of the Fruit Grow-
ers Association in California. The New York party to the con-
tract repudiated the arbitration clause. While the court held that
it could not compel the repudiator to proceed to arbitration in
another state, it did enforce the provision of Sec. 5 of the Arbitra-
tion Law which authorizes stay of any action brought in disregard
of the agreement to arbitrate. The only recourse then, for either
-' C. P. A. § 1448, par. 2.
-' Application of Iuter-Ocean Food Products, Inc., 206 App. Div. 426.
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party, was suit in the courts of California, where specific perform-
ance of arbitration is not compelled.
At this point, and in this connection, attention may be called
to two facts, which testify alike to the wide-spread appeal of the
principle of arbitration and recognition of its merits, and to the
importance of correcting anomalies in the law. Both indicate that
such a situation will likely soon be impossible to occur, as arbitra-
tion promises soon to be interstate and country-wide in its opera-
tion and beneficent effects. One of these is the zealous work of the
American Bar Association and of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, to bring about the adoption of a uniform Arbitration
Law, containing the specific performance system of the New York
Law, in all the States. The other is the Bill pending in Congress,
with every prospect of passage into law, of a Federal Arbitration
Law, with similar features, applicable in all cases of interstate and
foreign commercial controversies. The successful accomplishment
of one or both of these programs will be a signal triumph, giving
increased sanction to the arbitral system, and greatly increasing
its availability and use.
The radical reformation accomplished by the New York Arbitra-
tion Law, which has sufficiently been set forth, may be aptly sum-
marized in the language of the unanimous decision of the Appel-
late Division, in the Berizzi v. Krausz case :25
"The Legislature (in enacting the Arbitration Law) manifest-
ed an unmistakable intention to establish a FoRux FOR AR-
BITRATION in the place of the submissions to arbitrators
which had hitherto been possible under the. Code of Civil Pro-
cedure [now Civil Practice Act], and around which had grown
up many fetters imposed by the courts in a laudable effort to
protect the rights of litigants [citing cases].
"The disposition today is to afford the widest possible oppor-
tunity for arbitration confined only by those rules imposed by
the Legislature. As was said in Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib
(supra), 'Section 2 of the Statute DECLARES A NEW PUBLiC
POLICY."
This ease of Berizzi v. Krauz well illustrates the great facilities
of the arbitral system under the statute, and the entire freedom
of the procedure in the regular courts. It may be taken as a con-
venient text for passing now from the legal phases of the New
Arbitration to some of its more salient practical advantages in the
Z Supra note 3.
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expeditious administration of justice, at the minimum of time, ex-
pense and legal uncertainty.
The case was that of the sale of a lot of bamboo meat skewers,
made in China and imported under a contract containing the arbi-
tration clause. Upon arrival, the skewers were rejected by the
buyer as not merchantable because of bad quality. The seller
thereupon sold the skewers on the market at a low price, and
claimed the difference up to the contract price as damages for
breach of contract. The other party refusing to arbitrate, the
Supreme Court, on application, ordered the arbitration to proceed
and appointed the arbitrator. The hearing was had, the award
was rendered, and was confirmed by the court. A motion for re-
argument was granted, and the award was vacated by the court,
"on the ground that the arbitrator has made extensive investi-
gations upon his own initiative, and hence precluded cross-ex-
amination with respect thereto."
It appeared, that after the parties had presented their evidence
and closed the hearing, the arbitrator had taken a number of the
skewers, exhibits in the case, and had gone out into the market,
interviewed numerous buyers, and ascertained that in fact the
skewers were of bad quality and not marketable; the same facts
were also reported to him by an assistant whom he had sent out
on a like quest. The arbitrator himself presented an affidavit on
the motion, in which he admitted: "It was on the strength of the
personal investigation which the arbitrator made, in addition to
the testimony and facts presented on the actual arbitration before
him, that the deponent's decision was reached."
The lower court therefore vacated the award for the alleged
misconduct of the arbitrator. On appeal to the Appellate Division,
that Court, by unanimous opinion, reversed the order and sus-
tained the award and the actions of the arbitrator. The Appel-
late Court said:
"In reaching his conclusion, the learned justice at Special Term
would seem to have overlooked the FUNDAMENTAL DITRENCE
between an arbitration and a trial.
"In an arbitration the arbitrator is frequently selected DE-
CAUSE OP THE KNOWLEDGE which he has acquired of facts relating
to matter in dispute from sources other than the parties to the
controversy.
"To compel the arbitrator to follow the rules of evidence,
such as the right of cross-examination in connection with all the
16
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evidence considered by the arbitrator, .... in the end we will
have some sort of modified trial ...
"While the respondent's contefition might have carried much
force when arbitrations WERE LOOKED AT ASKANCE, yet since the
enactment of the Arbitration Law, it would seem that said sec-
tion, to be consistent therewith, should be held as intending
simply to provide THE ELEMENTARY REQUIREMENTS OF HONESTY,
FULL HEARING, AND IMPARTIALITY [citing cases].
"In other words, the clear path would seem to require that the
section above quoted (i.e. specifying grounds for vacating
awards) -permitting the court to vacate ain award, should be
strictly construed in favor of the award."
With arbitration raised thus to a legal status, and the law itself
having provided a "Forum for Arbitration" as a "new public
policy," in the carrying out of which simply "the elementary re-
quirements of honesty, full hearing, and impartiality" are the only
essentials, let us notice some of the manifest advantages which
the arbitral system affords in the settlement of legal controversies,
whether of law or of fact or mixed or both.
Instead of three years, or a year, or any indefinite delay, it is
apparent that arbitration may be fully effected and a final decision
rendered, within a very few days. There is no loss of time, or the
very minimum; the parties can meet at their convenience, by day
or night, at the office or home of either or of the arbitrator. They
bring their proofs, witnesses or documents, and their counsel or
attorneys, if they so desire. There, in an atmosphere of quiet and
peace, conducive to conciliation and harmony, the matters are
submitted, and discussed, and decided, and the parties may go
about their other affairs.
In going into a trial before a judge in court or before judge and
jury, what a haphazard chance it is. The judge is a lawyer, may
be quite unfamiliar with business, or totally ignorant of the special
matter, or trade custom, or quality of goods brought before him.
The jurors are gathered here and there, from every line of business
or none at all; and are equally if not more unfamiliar with the
intricacies or special features of the matter they are required to
pass judgment upon. But the arbitrator is chosen by the parties,
most often from the same line of business; and chosen, not only for
his admitted fairness and impartiality, but because of his special
or expert knowledge of the very business involved. In a word,
he is chosen to decide, because he especially knows that business,
and knows how to decide. Instead of having to call numerous, and
often conflicting expert witnesses, to prove to a jury questions of
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quality, or process, or trade custom, etc., the arbitrator, chosen
from that particular business, knows in a moment all about the
matters in dispute. He can decide not only more quickly, but far
more surely and exactly right than judge or jury, for he decides as
an expert upon the subject in dispute. Hence both parties are
more likely to be satisfied with his award.
Arbitration itself suggests conciliation and harmony, and if held
before a mutual friend, or a recognized expert, in the same line of
business as the parties, in the office or the home, away from the
atmosphere of the court room charged with the spirit of hostility,
the previous friendly relations of the parties are much more certain
to be maintained, and the course of their business relations con-
tinue uninterruptedly. There usually is no disagreeable or hurt-
ful publicity given to the fact of a dispute between the parties,
as is inevitable in a public lawsuit in court. When a difference
arises over a business transaction, perhaps between parties long
friendly and with important business relations, and they rush off
to their respective attorneys, and each declares the attitude of the
other party unjust and indefensible, and suit is filed, containing
frequently charges of bad faith and dishonesty, the end of personal
and business relations usually is abrupt, and ill-will and acrimony
take their place in the feelings of both. But where a clause for
arbitration exists in the contract, the initial disagreement is in-
evitably much less acute in its reactions, and the parties look for,
ward to a speedy adjustment in closed hearings by arbitrators,
rather than to a long and often bitter fight in court. So the moral,
as well as the economic value of the principle of arbitration is in-
estimably great and important as making for peave and good will.
Moreover, very valuable and important trade secrets or secret
processes may be involved in the prospective controversy. If the
case goes into the courts, the testimony disclosing these valued
secrets is public and may be heard by any interested competitor, and
through the press may be broadcasted to the public, so that the
very valuable trade secret becomes public property and its special
value to one or both parties is destroyed. Unless one of the
parties resists compliance with the award, so that it becomes neces-
sary for the other to file the award in court to compel performance,
or unless both parties freely consent, there is no public record made
at all of the whole matter; and even where the bare record of
submission and award are filed in court, the evidence on which it is
founded is not filed or published-so that the personal or business
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harm, and maybe great damage to credit, which might result from
public court proceedings, are eliminated.
The foregoing are among the most salient and apparent ad-
vantages of the arbitral procedure over the delays, costs and harm-
ful publicity of court procedure. Moreover, with the award, rend-
ered after a full and fair hearing, the matter is ended. There are
no further long delays of costly appeals. All these are important
among "the fundamental differences between an arbitration and
a trial," as pointed out in the Berizzi-Krausz Case. These dif-
ferences are well specified in another recent New York case.
0 On
a motion t6 confirm an arbitral award, the court said:
"There is no provision authorizing the court to vacate an
award because it is against the weight of evidence or because
perchance there is no evidence to support it.
"The strict rules governing an action are not applicable to a
proceeding of this nature. An arbitration, while it partakes of
the nature of a quasi judicial proceeding, is not such a proceed-
ing in a technical sense. It is a domestic tribunal, as distinguish-
ed from a regularly organized court. The very existence of the
of the tribunal depends upon the voluntary act of the disput-
ants. They select their own judges. Its object and aim is to
arrive at a just determination of the matters in dispute, and
finally dispose of the same in a speedy and inexpensive way, and
thus avoid any future litigation between the parties.
"The arbitrators are usually laymen, inexperienced in the
technical rules of law, but usually possessed of a fund of common
sense which enables them to do substantial justice between the
parties. To require an arbitrator to follow the fixed rules of
law in arriving at his award would operate to defeat the object
of the proceeding. The proper court would still have to pass
upon and decide the law and the facts as if no award had been.
made.
"The court has no supervisory powers over an award. If
the arbitrators keep within their jurisdiction, their award will
not be set aside because they have erred in judgment either upon
the law or the facts."
This is the common law rule everywhere applicable to the pro-
ceedings and awards or aibitrators, and long antedates the special
enforcement features of the new Arbitration Law. As the rule
and its reason are stated by the Court of Appeals and the Ap-
pelate Division:
"The merits of an award, however unreasonable or unjust it
9 Everett v. Brown, 198 N. Y. Supp. 462.
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may be, cannot be reinvestigated, for otherwise the award, in-
stead of being the end of the litigation, would simply be a use-
less step in its progress.
2 7
"The Arbitration Law expressly provides that sections 2374
and 2375 (now Sees. 1457 and 1458, C. P. A.), among others
shall apply to arbitrations. Those Code sections state the
grounds on which an arbitration award may be vacated or modi-
fied: vacated for fraud, partiality, misconduct, or exceeding
powers; modified for evident miscalculation of figures, mistake of
person or matter of imperfection of form."
Thus are defined the scope, powers, procedure, and high ef-
ficiency of this "domestic tribunal," of the "forum for arbitra-
tion," existing from earliest times, and now given added dignity
and status by the new Arbitration Law of New York, the greatest
commercial state of the union and of the world. This sketch is
already too full and too long to permit special review of the very
similar statutes of England or New Jersey as they are modeled
on the same broad and effective lines.
New Jersey has enacted an arbitration law modeled upon the
New York Statute which went into effect on July 4th of last
year. Within another twelve months a uniform arbitration law,
embodying the provisions of the New York and New Jersey stat-
utes will be submitted, beyond doubt, to the legislatures of all
other states. Hence a thorough -understanding of the subject
by the entire legal profession is vitally important.
THE ARBITRATION SOCIETY OF AMERICA.
It remains but to make brief and special reference to a highly
unique and very efficient organization dedicated to the single
purpose of promoting the cause of arbitration under the new
law, and of affording special facilities for the operation of its
procedure, conducting a fully organized "Forum for Arbitration."
Unique it is; for while there are today forty-seven of the largest
organized industries and commercial organizations in New York
City alone, which maintain and operate arbitration tribunals of
their own within their respective lines of business, the Arbitration
Society of America is organized to maintain and operate a special
forum for arbitration open to all lines of business and to all men;
and it has already sixty-five trade divisions for arbitration organ-
ized among the leading trades and industries of the city, a number
-1 Sweet v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 19.
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steadily increasing, besides many filial organizations throughout
the state and generally over the country.
Many great institutions have had their origin in the inspiration
and initiative of one man. In like wise the Arbitration Society of
America is the concept and pre-dilect offspring of thought and
zealous activity of one man, former Judge Moses H. Grossman of
New York City. Always earnest in promoting the principle and
practice of friendly arbitration rather than litigation, he recogniz-
ed the great potentialities of the new arbitration law of New York,
and conceived the plan of an incorporated institution devoted to
the sole purpose of promoting that principle and practice. So was
it that on May 13, 1922, in association with a number of the lead-
ing factors in the public and commercial life of the city, the Arbi-
tration Society of America was incorporated, under the Mem-
bership Corporation Laws of the State, and a't once began its
very active and altruistic career.
A graphic idea of the recognized importance of the movement
inaugurated by the Arbitration Society of America may be had
from the names of its Board of Governors, all men who are leaders
in the great financial, commercial and legal interests of the city
and state. They are: Jules S. Bache, Banker; Henry Ives Cobb,
Architect; Robert Grier Cooke, President of the Fifth Avenue As-
sociation; Moses H. Grossman, Former Judge, head of Law firm of
House, Grossman and Vorhaus; Charles L. Guy, Justice of the
Supreme Court of the State of N. Y.; Robert Lee Hatch, President
of the Rotary Club of New York; Almet F. Jenks, Former Pre-
siding Justice of the Appellate Division, Supreme Court, Second
Department, of New York; William B. Joyce, Chairman of the
Board, National Surety Company; Frederick Kernochan, Chief
Justice of the Court of Special Sessions; Samuel McCune Lindsay,
of Columbia University and President of the New York Academy
of Political Science; Marion MeMillin, Banker and Vice-President
of the American Light and Traction Company; Samuel McRoberts,
President of the Metropolitan Trust Company; James A. O'Gor-
man, Former U. S. Senator-former Supreme Court Justice;
Thomas I Parkinson, Vice-President of Equitable Life Assurance
Co.; William C. Redfield, Former Secretary of Commerce in the
Cabinet of President Wilson; David A Schulte, President of the
Schulte Cigar Stores; Franklin Simon, President of Franklin
Simon and Co.; Frank H. Sommer, Dean of the Law School of
New York University; Harlan F. Stone, Dean of Law School of
Columbia University.
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The first President of the Society, Mr. Emerson MeMillin, died
shortly after assuming the office, and his great influence and assist-
ance were lost to it. His successor has not yet been selected from
among the eminent men under consideration for the vacancy. In
the meanwhile Vice-President Lindsay discharges the duties of the
office; while the active executive work is directed by Judge Gross-
man, its founder and Vice-President of the Society.
Now with over one thousand of the leading business organiza-
tions of the City in active membership, it has conducted success-
fully over five hundred arbitration cases, involving every variety
of question of law and of fact, and from a few thousand to over
half a million dollars in money; and this is to the all but universal
satisfaction of the parties concerned. The Society maintains ex-
ecutive offices at 115 Broadway, and a series of specially adapted
audience rooms where the hearings are held. In each of the 65
trades or business organizations affiliated with it, the Society
has lists of official arbitrators including the recognized leaders in
those several branches, and the best known lawyers at the New
York Bar, to act and who do act, to a large extent gratuitously,
or for very nominal fees, as arbitrators in the various classes of
controversies, as they arise and are submitted to the good offices
of the Arbitration Society for settlement.
The Arbitration Society and its work have been endorsed by
formal resolution by a meeting of 64 judges representing all the
state and federal courts of the state, by the Commercial Law
League of America, and by representatives of nearly every large
trade and industry of the city, the latter as evidenced by the 65
trade goups belonging to it and providing arbitrators for its work.
Winners and losers alike in its many arbitrations bear witness,
in hundreds of letters in its files, to the wide satisfaction which
has resulted from the procedure. Every newspaper of the Metro-
polis, and many in other cities and states, as well as most of the
great metropolitan magazines, have united in giving the widest
publicity to this new organ of judicial efficiency, and the most
cordial endorsement and approval to its plan and work.
But one criticism, and that in a very friendly and regretful
tone has been made, and that not against the principle of arbitra-
tion or its operation under the Law; but against the warp in human
nature which leads so many to prefer the "law's delays" to the
speedy and just procedure of arbitration. As this objection comes
from a friendly and fair-minded source of much well-deserved in-
fluence; and as a like objection may have occurred to many other
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minds, a few words may be here devoted to a practical reply to the
criticism implied in the article referred to.
The New York Law Review, in a recent editorial article on
arbitration, points to the great congestion of the- court calendars
in this District, with some 27,000 undisposed of cases and the con-
sequent long delays before justice can be had; also to the number of
active organizations maintaining arbitration machinery for the
trial and settlement of controversies; and from this it draws the
conclusion that arbitration as a means of settlement is not popular
nor effective in relieving the critical conditions in the courts. The
editor concedes that a main reason for this reluctance to resort
to arbitration is that at least one party to every controversy feels
that he is in the wrong and does not want speedy justice done,
but prefers to take the chances of long delayed litigation. This
then is not a defect of an arbitral procedure, but a defect of human
nature consciously in the wrong, and hoping in the contingencies
of delay to escape the rendering of right.
But the objection itself suggests remedy and cure for the evil.
Naturally, such men, feeling themselves in the wrong and seeking
advantage by delay, will not enter into an ex post facto stipulation
to submit the controversy to arbitration. The remedy is very sim-
ple and complete: the clause for arbitration of any disputes which
may arise, should be incorporated in the original contract between
the parties. This simple device will, under the Arbitration Law,
compel the parties to arbitrate, and the courts will enforce per-
formance. No formal or technical words are required; any words
such as "any dispute arising under this contract shall be subject
to arbitration," fully ousts the law's delays and makes arbitration
compulsory. It is of an ever-increasing custom to insert such
clauses in contracts, or order forms, in letters which evidence the
contract, even on letter-heads or bill-heads, or among the "con-
ditions" frequently printed on the reverse side of such documents.
The constant use of the "arbitration clause" in all kinds of written
and printed contracts and correspondence forming contracts and
in all memoranda of agreements is strongly urged by the Arbitra-
tion Society and by all the bodies actively interested in arbitration
as a means of settlement of disputes among their members. When
a contract, contemplating advantageous business, is being formed
between two parties, they are in good humor and disposed to fair
dealing; then is the time to insert the simple "arbitration agree-
ment" which both will readily accept, as neither contemplates or
desires dispute or litigation over the matter. Then if dispute does
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thereafter arise, both parties must and may submit with good
grace and good will to the arbitral settlement agreed to in advance
and will likely go into and come out of it satisfied with its expe-
ditious and inexpensive and just results, and with their previous
good dispositions and business relations preserved.
This is arbitration under the New York Arbitration Law. The
Arbitration Society of America welcomes communications in re-
gard to its program and its work, and will give prompt and help-
ful response to any seeker after knowledge of the benefits of the
arbitral method which it so earnestly advocates and promotes.
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